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Abstract
Pricing and reimbursement of orphan drugs are an issue of high priority for policy makers, legislators, health care
professionals, industry leaders, academics and patients. This study aims to conduct a literature review to provide
insight into the drivers of orphan drug pricing and reimbursement.
Although orphan drug pricing follows the same economic logic as drug pricing in general, the monopolistic
power of orphan drugs results in high prices: a) orphan drugs benefit from a period of marketing exclusivity; b)
few alternative health technologies are available; c) third-party payers and patients have limited negotiating power;
d) manufacturers attempt to maximise orphan drug prices within the constraints of domestic pricing and
reimbursement policies; and e) substantial R&D costs need to be recouped from a small number of patients.
Although these conditions apply to some orphan drugs, they do not apply to all orphan drugs. Indeed, the small
number of patients treated with an orphan drug and the limited economic viability of orphan drugs can be
questioned in a number of cases. Additionally, manufacturers have an incentive to game the system by artificially
creating monopolistic market conditions.
Given their high price for an often modest effectiveness, orphan drugs are unlikely to provide value for money.
However, additional criteria are used to inform reimbursement decisions in some countries. These criteria may
include: the seriousness of the disease; the availability of other therapies to treat the disease; and the cost to the
patient if the medicine is not reimbursed. Therefore, the maximum cost per unit of outcome that a health care
payer is willing to pay for a drug could be set higher for orphan drugs to which society attaches a high social
value.
There is a need for a transparent and evidence-based approach towards orphan drug pricing and reimbursement.
Such an approach should be targeted at demonstrating the relative effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and economic
viability of orphan drugs with a view to informing pricing and reimbursement decisions.
Background
A rare disease is a disease with a very low prevalence. In
the European Union (EU), rare diseases are defined as
life-threatening or chronically debilitating diseases with
a prevalence of 5 out of 10,000 individuals or less [1].
The EU defines an orphan drug as either a medicinal
product intended for a life-threatening or chronically
debilitating rare disease or a medicinal product that
would not be developed without incentives because its
sales are unlikely to generate sufficient return on invest-
ment. An additional requirement to qualify as an orphan
drug is that no satisfactory method exists to diagnose,
prevent or treat the disease or, if such a method exists,
that the medicinal product will be of significant benefit
to those affected by that disease [1].
The EU implemented specific policies in 2000 to sti-
mulate innovation in the field of orphan drugs [1]. Man-
ufacturers that have an orphan designation (i.e. the
award of orphan status to a drug) for a medicinal pro-
duct benefit from: a) protocol assistance (scientific
advice during the product development phase); b) direct
access to the European Drugs Agency (EMA) Centra-
lised Procedure with respect to registration; c) ten-year
marketing exclusivity starting from the date of market-
ing authorization (i.e. the approval to market a drug);
and d) financial incentives (fee reduction or exemptions,
possible assistance with research and development).
Orphan drug policies can be considered a success as the
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zations granted by EMA increased from 270 designa-
tions and 22 authorizations by the end of 2005 to 805
designations and 61 authorizations by April 2011 [2].
Whereas decisions surrounding orphan designation
and marketing authorization of orphan drugs are taken
at the EU level, decisions governing pricing and reim-
bursement of orphan drugs are a member state respon-
sibility. As a result, evidence requirements, pricing and
reimbursement policies governing orphan drugs differ
between countries; thereby creating differences in access
to, prices and utilization of orphan drugs between coun-
tries [3].
Although a detailed discussion of differences between
drugs for rare diseases and for common diseases falls
outside the scope of this article, the reader should note
that the features of rare diseases and orphan drugs
make them an issue of high priority for policy makers,
researchers, legislators, health care professionals, indus-
try leaders, patients and interest groups. For instance,
the present EU system of orphan designation allows for
drugs for non-orphan diseases to be designated as
orphan drugs. The economic factors underlying orphan
designation can be questioned in some cases as a low
prevalence of a certain indication does not equal a low
return on investment for the drug across its indications.
High-quality evidence about clinical added value of
orphan drugs is rarely available at the time of marketing
authorization due to the low number of patients. More-
over, economic evaluations tend to find that orphan
drugs are not cost-effective because the incremental cost
for the additional health benefit provided by the orphan
drug is usually high. Finally, given the high price of
orphan drugs, policy makers are faced with an increas-
ing proportion of pharmaceutical expenditure being
spent on orphan drugs [4]. The aim of this study is to
conduct a review of the international scientific literature
to provide insight into two policy aspects surrounding
rare diseases and orphan drugs, i.e. the pricing and
reimbursement of orphan drugs. In contrast with a
recent study from the industry perspective [5], this
review addresses pricing and reimbursement of orphan
drugs mainly from the health care payer perspective.
Pricing
Pricing of orphan drugs follows the same economic
logic as drug pricing in general: the price of an orphan
drug is set by a manufacturer in an effort to recoup
research and development (R&D) costs and to attain a
certain profit margin. Additionally, the price takes into
account the value of the product to the patient, market
conditions (e.g. the existence of alternative health tech-
nologies) and the regulatory pricing and reimbursement
environment in a country. However, the market for
orphan drugs has inherent market failures, thus result-
ing in high prices due to a number of reasons.
Monopoly
In the EU, orphan drugs benefit from a period of mar-
keting exclusivity following marketing authorization.
Marketing exclusivity gives a monopoly to the manufac-
turer as no other company is allowed to market the
orphan drug during the exclusivity period. The monopo-
listic power is strengthened by the fact that no alterna-
tive health technology exists for many orphan drugs.
Additionally, marketing can further boost market power.
Under these conditions, manufacturers have an incentive
to charge the maximum price for an orphan drug that
the market is able to bear. Health care payers have lim-
ited negotiating power, often lack information about the
cost structure of orphan drugs, and are under pressure
from patient advocacy groups and media to accommo-
date new orphan drugs [6]. As a result, health care
payers are often forced to accept the price offered by
the manufacturer.
For instance, a recent study compared prices of 28
designated orphan drugs with prices of 16 comparable
non-designated drugs for rare disease indications [7].
Price data were based on official hospital prices (per
defined daily dose) in Belgium in 2010. Orphan-desig-
nated drugs had a higher median price (€ 138.56 - IQR
€ 483.06) than non-designated drugs (€ 16.55 - IQR €
28.67) for rare disease indications (p < 0.01). The
authors concluded that awarding orphan designation
status in itself is associated with higher prices for drugs
for rare disease indications.
Manufacturers can attempt to create a monopoly mar-
k e tb ys p l i t t i n gu pad i s e a s ei n t os e v e r a ls u b - d i s e a s e s
that qualify as rare diseases (a practice called ‘disease
sub-setting’, ‘salami-slicing’ or ‘disease stratification’) [8].
In other words, artificial sub-sets of a common disease
are created with a view to qualifying as several rare dis-
eases. The domains of for example pharmacogenomics
and oncology are prime targets for creating new rare
diseases [9]. Disease stratification may have many bene-
fits for a manufacturer: the company can benefit from
measures to stimulate the development of its products,
the company creates a monopolistic market where
chronically ill patients receive long-term treatment with
its orphan drug, the company incurs lower marketing
costs as it needs to reach fewer medical specialists, mar-
keting exclusivity erases the possibility of ‘me-too’ com-
petitors, and the small market reduces the economic
viability for generic drugs [10].
The impact of monopolistic market power on prices
can also be witnessed in the observation of price
increases when a drug with a common indication
receives a second, orphan indication. This can be
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orphan drug Revatio
® for pulmonary arterial hyperten-
sion was more than six times more expensive than Via-
gra
® for erectile dysfunction in 2011.
In the EU, multiple orphan drugs can be authorised to
diagnose, prevent or treat a specific rare disease. As a
result, the monopolistic power of an orphan drug is
sometimes offset by the availability of other products
and competitive pressures may reduce prices. For
instance, advanced renal cell carcinoma and cystic fibro-
sis each have ten drugs with designated orphan status
[11]. Using available data on the annual cost per patient
of reimbursed orphan drugs in Belgium and the avail-
ability of alternative health technologies [4], 13 orphan
drugs with an alternative had a lower annual cost per
patient than 9 orphan drugs without an alternative,
although this finding was not statistically significant
(independent samples t-test; p = 0.183).
Price variation between countries
A study compared prices of ten orphan drugs between
25 EU countries [3]. Price data originated from phar-
maceutical industry, health authorities, retail or hospi-
tal pharmacies, and national databases. The authors
noted that some domestic pricing and reimbursement
policies provide incentives to maximise prices of
orphan drugs. Countries that adhere to free market
pharmaceutical pricing generally have higher drug
prices and, thus, higher prices for orphan drugs (e.g.
Germany) than countries that regulate prices (e.g. Por-
tugal, Spain). Prices of orphan drugs distributed
through the hospital pharmacy are not regulated in
most European countries, but are negotiated between
the manufacturer and an individual hospital. To have a
stronger negotiating position, some hospitals jointly
purchase orphan drugs from manufacturers. Also,
countries such as Belgium, Greece and Italy have
imposed price controls on orphan drugs distributed
through the hospital pharmacy. Manufacturers are free
to set prices of orphan drugs in the United Kingdom,
although the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme
(which regulates industry profitability rather than drug
prices) [12] and pharmaco-economic guidelines exert
downward pressure on prices of orphan drugs.
Although the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence in England does not frequently appraise
orphan drugs, the Scottish Medicines Consortium and
the All Wales Medicines Strategy Group do appraise
orphan drugs, with the latter for example having speci-
fic guidelines for appraising orphan drugs and ultra-
orphan drugs [13]. In France, the system of authoriza-
tion for temporary use allows manufacturers to freely
set and maximise the price for an orphan drug which
will be fully reimbursed.
Costs of R&D and market access
The high price of orphan drugs also derives from the
cost of the R&D process and of market access proce-
dures. R&D of drugs is a very expensive process asso-
ciated with a high attrition rate of potential products.
Furthermore, in the case of orphan drugs, these R&D
costs need to be recouped from a small number of
patients, thus resulting in high acquisition costs per
patient [14]. A European analysis of orphan drug prices
in 25 countries found that the price of an orphan drug
is higher for a disease with a lower prevalence [3]. Using
published data on the annual cost per patient of an
orphan drug in Belgium [4] and the prevalence of the
rare disease as derived from Orphanet [15], Figure 1
points to a negative association between the cost of an
orphan drug and the prevalence of the disease (y =
26230x
-0,5316;R
2 = 0.468). A similar inverse association
has also been observed using Italian data [16].
However, the need to recoup substantial R&D costs
from a small number of patients does not apply to all
orphan drugs. Some orphan drugs were approved on
the basis of historical use, where the manufacturer was
not required to produce new evidence on efficacy to
gain marketing authorization. In such cases, R&D costs
are small. The provision to license drugs without much
industry-investment in clinical trials can be illustrated
with the case of amifampridine (3,4-diaminopyridine
phosphate), which is approved for Lambert-Eaton syn-
drome. The clinical evidence underpinning this orphan
drug primarily referred to the literature on the free base
form of 3,4-diaminopyridine [17].
With respect to market access procedures, a recent
study showed that orphan drugs were less likely to gain
marketing authorization from EMA than other drugs
[18]. Furthermore, manufacturers have to comply with
different pricing and reimbursement procedures in each
member state, thereby raising the price of orphan drugs
[10]. Another driver of orphan drug prices occurs fol-
lowing marketing authorization. As many orphan drugs
are fast-tracked to market authorization (due to, for
example, the life-threatening nature of the disease and
the absence of alternative health technologies), regula-
tory authorities tend to impose expensive post-market-
ing surveillance programmes.
Many orphan drugs target few patients as they are
used to treat rare or ultra-rare diseases, the prevalence
of which is generally ill-researched. Also, not all patients
are diagnosed or need treatment [5]. Nevertheless, the
assertion that orphan drugs target few patients does not
apply to all cases [19]. First, certain orphan drugs have
proved to be effective against multiple rare diseases and,
thus, target a larger number of patients. Examples are
sorafenib, which has been approved by the EMA to treat
patients with hepatocellular carcinoma and advanced
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nated orphan indications in the EU. Second, the use of
an orphan drug for a rare disease may subsequently be
extended to a common disease. Bosentan, an orphan
drug for the treatment of pulmonary arterial hyperten-
sion, may also be effective to treat heart failure [20].
Third, a drug for a common disease may subsequently
develop an indication for a rare disease. An example is
sildenafil, whose initial indication of erectile dysfunction
was later extended to include pulmonary artery hyper-
tension and chronic thromboembolic pulmonary hyper-
tension. Fourth, while a disease may qualify as a rare
d i s e a s ei no n ec o u n t r y ,i tm a yb em o r ec o m m o ni n
other countries (e.g. drugs to treat tropical diseases).
Furthermore, a common disease in one country (e.g.
Balkan nephropathy) may qualify as a rare disease at EU
level [11]. Finally, although these diseases are individu-
ally rare, rare diseases collectively affect approximately
30 million Europeans [6].
Economic viability
Legislation in the EU attempts to address the issue of
the price and the economic viability of orphan drugs.
EU legislation is in place to reduce the period of mar-
keting exclusivity if an orphan drug turns out to be suf-
ficiently profitable [1]. However, it is not clear what is
meant by ‘sufficiently profitable’ and this legislation has
never been put into practice. The lack of economic via-
bility of orphan drugs can be questioned in certain
cases. Some orphan drugs probably do not require a
high level of investment to market the drug. For
instance, the costs of extending the indication of silde-
nafil to pulmonary artery hypertension and chronic
thromboembolic pulmonary hypertension are likely to
be limited to conducting clinical trials and to marketing.
Orphan biopharmaceuticals
Many orphan drugs (in development) are made by or
derived from living organisms using biotechnology. A
study focused on ex-manufacturer prices of biopharma-
ceuticals in five European countries (France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom), Australia,
Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the United States [21]. The
authors argued that biopharmaceutical prices may be
less regulated and higher than those of chemically-
derived drugs given that: a) some countries exclude bio-
pharmaceuticals used in hospital from price regulation;
b) price comparisons with other products in a therapeu-
tic class are less likely to occur for biopharmaceuticals
with a novel mechanism of action or indication; c) infor-
mal cost-effectiveness thresholds may be higher for bio-
pharmaceuticals that address unmet clinical needs or
that treat rare diseases; and d) some countries have in
place industrial policies to support the development of
biopharmaceuticals.
When the 20-year patent on a biopharmaceutical
expires, less expensive versions of the drug, so-called
biosimilar drugs or follow-on biologics, can enter the
market. Orphan biopharmaceuticals tend to face limited
competition from biosimilars due to difficulties in and
the costs of demonstrating bio-similarity. To substanti-
ate the claim of biosimilarity in Europe, the manufac-
turer must conduct a direct and extensive comparability
exercise between the biosimilar and the reference bio-
pharmaceutical, with a view to demonstrating that the
two products have similar quality, safety and efficacy.
R
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Figure 1 Association between annual Belgian cost per patient of an orphan drug and disease prevalence.
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Economic evaluation of orphan drugs
Evidence derived from economic evaluations is used to
inform pharmaceutical reimbursement (and/or pricing)
decisions in many countries. The economic evaluation
of orphan drugs is inhibited by the existence of often
limited and weak clinical data at launch time. In the
context of rare diseases, it may prove difficult to recruit
a sufficient number of patients and medical centers in
clinical trials, thus raising costs. Orphan drug trials (in
for example the field of oncology) may be halted early
on ethical grounds when an interim analysis demon-
strates clinical superiority of the orphan drug in terms
of an intermediate outcome measure such as progres-
sion-free survival. It has been recommended to allow
greater use of surrogate outcome measures for orphan
drugs if clinical data are incomplete, but impose at the
same time a commitment to continue research [22].
A central component of this approach is the commit-
ment to ongoing evaluation through, for example, patient
registries of rare diseases designed to collect the necessary
data to follow up and evaluate uncertainties surrounding
the longer-term effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
orphan drugs used in the treatment of rare diseases [23].
Setting up patient and disease registries is part of EU pol-
icy and is an action line in rare disease plans that many
member states have in place or are setting up. The use of
patient registries would support the decision-making pro-
cess, inform clinical practice, and could provide informa-
tion about long-term adverse events.
However, patient registries of rare diseases have their
limitations. A patient registry may be biased if the
patient etiology and disease severity change over time.
Also, patient registries tend to collect data on a specific
orphan drug used in the treatment of a rare disease, but
not on alternative treatments, thus providing partial
information to calculate the cost-effectiveness of the
orphan drug relative to an alternative treatment.
Furthermore, new treatment strategies may become
available during the period covered by the registry.
Therefore, patient registries of rare diseases need to be
set up in a flexible way to collect sufficient data and to
account for the evolution in patient population and
treatment strategies over their lifecycle.
Societal considerations
Given their high price for an often modest effectiveness,
orphan drugs are unlikely to provide value if their cost-
effectiveness ratio is compared to a fixed threshold
value (e.g. the threshold of £20,000-£30,000 per QALY
used by NICE in England and Wales [24]) [14]. This
raises the question of whether society needs to provide
incentives to pharmaceutical industry to develop orphan
drugs when the costs surpass the value that society
attaches to the health benefits produced by orphan
drugs [25]? In order to answer this question, it has been
argued that other societal considerations may matter
when evaluating an orphan drug, such as the observa-
tion that orphan drug reimbursement conforms to the
principle of social solidarity in which vulnerable groups
receive support; that orphan drugs tend to target life-
threatening diseases for which there may be no alterna-
tive therapy; and that orphan drugs have a considerable
impact on patients’ health care expenditures if they
would have to incur the drug costs themselves. For
instance, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Commit-
tee in Australia is reported to take into account such
societal considerations [26].
How can these various considerations be aggregated?
In other words, how can the often high cost-effective-
ness ratio, weak clinical data, small health benefit, high
cost and absence of an alternative therapy for orphan
drugs be taken into account in a payer’s decision to
cover such a drug? It has been argued that the threshold
ICER should be higher for drugs to which society
attaches a high social value [14]. Alternatively, equity
weights could be applied to outcome measures accord-
ing to disease prevalence [27]. Methodological guidance
issued by NICE in January 2009 stated that weights
should consider the uncertainty surrounding the evi-
dence of the drug’s clinical effectiveness and the value
that patients place on additional months of life [28].
Weighted outcomes would increase the health gain
achieved by an orphan drug, so that there is a higher
probability that an orphan drug has an ICER below the
threshold value. However, to the best of the author’s
knowledge, this approach has not been applied in prac-
tice yet.
Orphan drugs may attract a high social value,
although more research is needed to elicit social values
ascribed to orphan drugs and to rare diseases [25]. A lit-
erature review has indicated that society attaches a
higher value to health improvements experienced by
patients who have worse lifetime health prospects [29].
In 2005, NICE in England and Wales set up a Citizen’s
Council with a view to identifying criteria that the
National Health Service may use to value orphan drugs
more highly [30]. The top three criteria were the degree
of severity of the disease, whether treatment achieved
more than just stabilize the disease, and whether the
disease was life-threatening. Eighty percent of the Coun-
cil indicated that disease severity might be a reason to
pay a premium for drugs, but disease rarity was not. A
Norwegian study explored whether a societal preference
existed for giving priority to the treatment of rare dis-
eases and for accepting a higher threshold ICER for
orphan drugs [31]. Although respondents supported
equal treatment rights for patients with rare diseases, no
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diseases implied that patients with common diseases
could not be treated in the context of a finite budget.
The relevance of societal considerations can be illu-
strated with several orphan drug decisions made by the
Medicine Reimbursement Committee in Belgium and
NICE in England and Wales. A Belgian study reviewed
reimbursement dossiers of 26 orphan drugs submitted
between January 2002 and June 2008 [4]. Reimburse-
ment was awarded to 22 orphan drugs. The Medicine
Reimbursement Committee advised to reimburse 19
drugs and reimbursement was approved by the Minister
of Social Affairs. Although the Committee did not issue
an advice relating to one drug, reimbursement was
approved by the Minster of Social Affairs. For the
remaining two orphan drugs, the dossiers indicated that
both the Medicine Reimbursement Committee and the
manufacturer proposed a number of elements for nego-
tiation - including a price decrease, employment oppor-
tunities, restrictions on the size of the patient
population, the funding of diagnostic tests by the com-
pany, a reduction of the dosage - which may have
played a role in awarding reimbursement. The rationale
for not granting reimbursement to four orphan drugs
may be related to the high cost of these drugs in com-
parison with alternative drugs or the existence of other
non-orphan indications of the drug.
Despite an unfavorable cost-effectiveness ratio, NICE
approved imatinib for the treatment of chronic myeloid
leukaemia with an ICER of £37,000 per QALY in the
chronic phase, £38,400 per QALY in the accelerated
phase and £49,000 per QALY in the blast phase in the
absence of any effective alternative therapy (except for
bone marrow transplantation) and on equity grounds
[32]. A second example relates to enzyme replacement
therapy for Fabry’s disease. An economic evaluation sta-
ted that, although the ICER of enzyme replacement
therapy is at least six times higher than the threshold
value adopted by NICE, clinicians and manufacturers
argued that the National Health Service had no option
but to provide this therapy because Fabry’sd i s e a s ei sa
rare disease [33].
Innovative mechanisms have been proposed for the
reimbursement of orphan drugs. Risk-sharing arrange-
ments are schemes in which the manufacturer shares
the risk with the health care payer that the product may
not be effective for a particular patient. If the product
does not have the expected effect, the company may
loose some or all product revenue, or needs to provide
a replacement product [34]. Such arrangements are
instituted at the level of a defined patient population,
may require physicians to be trained in the appropriate
use of the drug, and necessitate the implementation of a
tracking system to follow up its use. For instance, the
Scottish Medicines Consortium has in place an Orphan
Medicines Risk Share scheme [35]. Medicines included
in the risk share scheme are agalsidase alpha and beta
for Fabry’s disease; imiglucerase and miglustat for type 1
Gaucher’s disease; and iloprost for pulmonary arterial
hypertension. In England and Wales, NICE has insti-
tuted a risk-sharing scheme for the supply of interferon
beta and glatiramer acetate which incorporated agreed
target treatment effects for patients with multiple sclero-
sis [36]. If treatment effects were not achieved, the
scheme included the option to reduce the drug price to
guarantee its cost-effectiveness at a threshold value of
£36,000 per QALY. However, some concerns with this
scheme have recently been identified [37] and some
have argued that the money should be better allocated
to funding a randomized controlled trial of interferon
beta [27].
Discussion
In general, the monopolistic power granted to orphan
drugs results in high prices. Although these conditions
apply to some orphan drugs, it should be emphasised
that they do not apply to all orphan drugs. This study
has demonstrated that the small number of patients
treated with an orphan drug and the limited economic
viability of orphan drugs can be questioned in a number
of cases. Additionally, manufacturers have an incentive
to game the system by artificially creating monopolistic
market conditions.
Therefore, there is a need to assess orphan drugs on an
individual basis to determine whether their specific fea-
tures warrant high prices. This assessment should take into
account current and planned indications, the existence of
alternative health technologies, the total number of
patients across registered and off-label indications, and
R&D costs. Health care payers could impose the require-
ment to justify the price based on detailed information
about the R&D costs and return on investment at a global
level. This could be accompanied by regular monitoring
throughout the product’s lifecycle. Such an approach
necessitates that health care payers make a subjective jud-
gement about an appropriate level of return on investment.
A number of mechanisms to optimise R&D of orphan
drugs and to control prices of orphan drugs have been
proposed [38]. Auctions of patents have been suggested
as a way to reward manufacturers for successfully devel-
oping a new orphan drug. Advance purchase commit-
ments entail that the health care payer agrees to pay a
specific price for a specified number of units of an
orphan drug, thereby guaranteeing a minimum reward
for the innovator. Under pay-as-you-go schemes, the
health care payer provides additional rewards as a
potential drug candidate progresses through the R&D
process. Authorities should consider carefully the right
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diseases.
Several European countries have put in place govern-
ment intervention in rare disease and orphan drug mar-
kets with a view to keep down prices, restrict public
reimbursement and promote a cost-effective use of
orphan drugs [4]. For instance, Belgium, France, Italy and
the Netherlands compare the price requested by the
manufacturer with the price in other countries. The Uni-
ted Kingdom has set up a system of profit control to con-
strain prices (although this system will be abolished in
favour of a value-based pricing approach from 2013/14)
and Sweden uses a system of public procurement at the
regional level in order to maximise price competition.
To gain reimbursement, a formal economic evaluation
needs to be performed in some, but not all European
countries. It should be noted that national authorities
tend to demand data on the effectiveness of orphan
drugs in a real-world setting rather than on their effi-
cacy in a structured setting. Also, as the cost-effective-
ness of an orphan drug is calculated relative to a
relevant comparator, there is a need for comparative
data. Both factors have implications for the design of
patient and disease registries. For orphan drugs that
provide a first-in-class therapy for unmet clinical needs,
the cost-effectiveness can be calculated on the basis of
studies comparing the orphan drug with placebo. For
orphan drugs that are marketed in the presence of com-
petitor health technologies, there is a need to compute
the cost-effectiveness based on head-to-head studies of
the orphan drug relative to a relevant comparator.
Conclusions
This study has identified and discussed several factors
affecting pricing and reimbursement of orphan drugs.
There is a need for a transparent and evidence-based
approach towards pricing and reimbursement of orphan
drugs. Such an approach should be targeted at demon-
strating the relative effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, cost
structure and economic viability of orphan drugs with a
view to informing pricing and reimbursement decisions.
Acknowledgements
Financial support for this research project was received from the Royal
Baudouin Foundation. The sponsor was not involved in the design of the
study; the conduct of the literature review; or the writing of the manuscript.
The publication of the study was not contingent on the sponsor’s approval
or censorship of the manuscript.
Authors’ contributions
SS designed the study, carried out the literature review and drafted the
manuscript.
Competing interests
The author has no conflicts of interest that are relevant to the content of
this manuscript.
Received: 22 February 2011 Accepted: 17 June 2011
Published: 17 June 2011
References
1. European Commission: Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European
Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal
products. Official Journal of the European Communities 2000, L 18/1.
2. Orphanet: The portal for rare diseases and orphan drugs. Orphanet 2011,
9-5, 2011. Ref Type: Electronic Citation.
3. Alcimed. Study on orphan drugs: Phase I: overview of the conditions for
marketing orphan drugs in Europe. Koning Boudewijnstichting 2006, 18-3,
2010. Ref Type: Electronic Citation.
4. Denis A, Simoens S, Fostier C, Mergaert L, Cleemput I: Health technology
assessment policy governing orphan diseases and orphan medicines.
Brussels, Belgian Health Care Knowledge Centre; 2009, Ref Type: Report.
5. Tambuyzer E: Rare diseases, orphan drugs and their regulation: questions
and misconceptions. Nat Rev Drug Discov 2010, 9:921-929.
6. Rinaldi A: Adopting an orphan. EMBO Rep 2005, 6:507-510.
7. Picavet E, Dooms M, Cassiman D, Simoens S: Drugs for rare diseases -
orphan designation status influences price. Appl Health Econ Health Policy
2011, 9:1-5.
8. Hollis A: Drugs for rare diseases: paying for innovation. In Health services
restructuring in Canada: new evidence and new directions. Edited by: Beach
C. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press; 2006:.
9. Loughnot D: Potential interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and
pharmacogenomics: a flood of orphan drugs and abuses? Am J Law Med
2005, 31:365-380.
10. Boon W, Moors E: Exploring emerging technologies using metaphors–a
study of orphan drugs and pharmacogenomics. Soc Sci Med 2008,
66:1915-1927.
11. Dear JW, Lilitkarntakul P, Webb DJ: Are rare diseases still orphans or
happily adopted? The challenges of developing and using orphan
medicinal products. Br J Clin Pharmacol 2006, 62:264-271.
12. Department of Health: Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme. London,
Department of Health; 2010, 18-3, 2010. Ref Type: Report.
13. All Wales Medicines Strategy Group: AWMSG policy on ultra-orphan
drugs. All Wales Medicines Strategy Group 2011, 21-2, 2011. Ref Type:
Electronic Citation.
14. Drummond MF, Wilson DA, Kanavos P, Ubel P, Rovira J: Assessing the
economic challenges posed by orphan drugs. Int J Technol Assess Health
Care 2007, 23:36-42.
15. Orphanet: The portal for rare diseases and orphan drugs. Orphanet 2010,
11-6, 2010. Ref Type: Electronic Citation.
16. Messori A, Cicchetti A, Patregani L: Orphan drugs. Relating price
determination to disease prevalence. BMJ 2010, 341:c4615.
17. Ferner RE, Hughes DA: The problem of orphan drugs. BMJ 2010, 341:
c6456.
18. Regnstrom J, Koenig F, Aronsson B, Reimer T, Svendsen K, Tsigkos S, et al:
Factors associated with success of market authorisation applications for
pharmaceutical drugs submitted to the European Medicines Agency. Eur
J Clin Pharmacol 2010, 66:39-48.
19. Maeder T: The orphan drug backlash. Sci Am 2003, 288:80-87.
20. Attina T, Camidge R, Newby DE, Webb DJ: Endothelin antagonism in
pulmonary hypertension, heart failure, and beyond. Heart 2005,
91:825-831.
21. Danzon PM, Furukawa MF: Prices and availability of biopharmaceuticals:
an international comparison. Health Aff (Millwood) 2006, 25:1353-1362.
22. Clarke JT: Is the current approach to reviewing new drugs condemning
the victims of rare diseases to death? A call for a national orphan drug
review policy. CMAJ 2006, 174:189-190.
23. Owen A, Sprinks J, Meehan A, Robb T, Hardy M, Kwasha D: A new model
to evaluate the long-term cost effectiveness of orphan and highly
specialised drugs following listing on the Australian Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme: the Bosentan Patient Registry. Journal of Medical
Economics 2008, 11:235-243.
24. Rawlins MD, Culyer AJ: National Institute for Clinical Excellence and its
value judgments. BMJ 2004, 329:224-227.
25. McCabe C, Claxton K, Tsuchiya A: Orphan drugs and the NHS: should we
value rarity? BMJ 2005, 331:1016-1019.
26. George B, Harris A, Mitchell A: Cost-effectiveness analysis and the
consistency of decision making: evidence from pharmaceutical
Simoens Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases 2011, 6:42
http://www.ojrd.com/content/6/1/42
Page 7 of 8reimbursement in australia (1991 to 1996). Pharmacoeconomics 2001,
19:1103-1109.
27. Hughes DA, Tunnage B, Yeo ST: Drugs for exceptionally rare diseases: do
they deserve special status for funding? QJM 2005, 98:829-836.
28. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence: Appraising life-extending,
end of life treatments London: National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence; 2009.
29. Dolan P, Shaw R, Tsuchiya A, Williams A: QALY maximisation and people’s
preferences: a methodological review of the literature. Health Econ 2005,
14:197-208.
30. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence: Citizens Council
Report Ultra Orphan Drugs. National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence 2005, 19-3, 2010. Ref Type: Electronic Citation.
31. Desser AS, Gyrd-Hansen D, Olsen JA, Grepperud S, Kristiansen IS: Societal
views on orphan drugs: cross sectional survey of Norwegians aged 40 to
67. BMJ 2010, 341:c4715.
32. Littlejohns P, Garner S, Doyle N, Macbeth F, Barnett D, Longson C: 10 years
of NICE: still growing and still controversial. Lancet Oncol 2009,
10:417-424.
33. Connock M, Juarez-Garcia A, Frew E, Mans A, Dretzke J, Fry-Smith A, et al: A
systematic review of the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
enzyme replacement therapies for Fabry’s disease and
mucopolysaccharidosis type 1. Health Technol Assess 2006, 10:iii-113.
34. Cook JP, Vernon JA, Manning R: Pharmaceutical risk-sharing agreements.
Pharmacoeconomics 2008, 26:551-556.
35. Scottish Medicines Consortium: Orphan Drugs Risk Share. Scottish
Medicines Consortium 2010, 19-3, 2010. Ref Type: Electronic Citation.
36. Department of Health: Cost effective provision of disease modifying
therapies for people with multiple sclerosis. 2002, 19-3, 2010. Ref Type:
Report.
37. Raftery J: Multiple sclerosis risk sharing scheme: a costly failure. BMJ
2010, 340:c1672.
38. Maurer SM: Choosing the right incentive strategy for research and
development in neglected diseases. Bull World Health Organ 2006,
84:376-381.
doi:10.1186/1750-1172-6-42
Cite this article as: Simoens: Pricing and reimbursement of orphan
drugs: the need for more transparency. Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases
2011 6:42.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Simoens Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases 2011, 6:42
http://www.ojrd.com/content/6/1/42
Page 8 of 8